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TOWARD ETHICAL PLEA BARGAINING
Erica Hashimoto*
Defendants in criminal cases are overwhelmingly more likely to
plead guilty than to go to trial. Presumably, at least a part of the reason
that most of them do so is that it is in their interest to plead guilty, i.e.,
they will receive a more favorable outcome if they plead guilty than if
they go to trial. The extent to which pleas reflect fair or rational
compromises in practice, however, depends upon a variety of factors,
including the amount of information each of the parties has about the
case. Some level of informational symmetry therefore is critical to the
plea process. Unfortunately, defendants currently have limited
constitutional rights to pre-plea discovery, and prosecutors pre-plea
have every incentive to conceal information that might be helpful to
defendants. Further compounding the problem, prosecutors in some
jurisdictions require as a condition of all pleas that defendants waive
any rights they may have to pre-plea disclosures from the government.
Because the failure to disclose impeachment or exculpatory information
seriously undermines the accuracy and just operation of the plea
process, the ethical rules governing prosecutors should be interpreted to
require pre-plea disclosure of exculpatory information and impeachment
information. While as a practical matter it ultimately would be up to
defense counsel to guarantee that prosecutors comply with such an
ethical obligation, these rules at the very least would give defense
counsel a tool to obtain helpful information so that they can more
accurately assess whether pleading guilty is in a client's best interest.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF PRE-PLEA DISCLOSURE OF EXCULPATORY AND
IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE
The vast majority of criminal cases in this country are resolved
through guilty pleas. In state courts, criminal defendants charged with
* Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law, A.B. Harvard College, J.D.
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felonies are over twenty times more likely to plead guilty than go to
trial.' The difference is just as dramatic in the federal criminal justice
system, where 86% of felony defendants plead guilty, and just over four
percent choose to go to trial. 2 Many factors may lead defendants to
plead guilty, 3 but providing defendants with access to information about
the case-in particular exculpatory or impeachment information-
before the guilty plea is critical to ensuring an accurate and equitable
plea process.4
First, pre-plea access to exculpatory and impeachment information
is necessary to the accuracy of the plea process, i.e., assuring that only
factually guilty defendants plead guilty. Some argue that requiring pre-
plea disclosure does not enhance the accuracy of pleas because
defendants will not plead guilty unless they in fact committed a crime,
and they are in the best position to know whether or not they committed
the crime. 5 This view relies on the faulty assumptions that: (1) factually
innocent defendants will not plead guilty, and (2) defendants always
know whether or not they committed a crime. 6
In fact, there are many reasons that factually innocent defendants
may decide to plead guilty if they do not have access to exculpatory or
I In 2002, roughly sixty-five percent of felony defendants in state court pleaded guilty, while
less than three percent of felony defendants went to trial. See BRIAN J. OSTROM ET. AL., NAT'L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2002: A NATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 61 (2003), available at
http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/ctadmin&CISOPTR=411
(noting that 65% of defendants in 17 state court systems pleaded guilty, while only 3% of
defendants in those same jurisdictions went to trial). Similarly, the Bureau of Justice Statistics
estimates that in 2004, sixty-six percent of state court felony defendants in the country's 75
largest counties pleaded guilty, while only three percent went to trial. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2004-
STATISTICAL TABLES, TABLE 19 (2008), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/fdluc/2004/tables/fdlucO4stl9.htm.
2 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE
PROCESSING, 2002 11 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fccp02.pdf. The
remaining defendants had cases against them dismissed. Id.
3 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2464 (2004) (arguing that rational calculations regarding likelihood of conviction at
trial and potential sentencing differentials do not fully account for plea decisions, and that many
other factors, including lawyer quality and bail decisions, also influence decisions to plead
guilty); John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 448 (2001) ("A defendant's decision to plead guilty, and the
terms of the bargain, will depend to some degree on an assessment of the risks of conviction.").
4 See Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and Wrongful Convictions, 57
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 651, 655-57 (2007) [hereinafter McMunigal, Guilty Pleas].
5 See, e.g., Douglass, supra note 3 (arguing that recognizing a pre-plea Brady obligation may
not increase the amount of information that a defendant has).
6 See McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, supra note 4 at 655-57; Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure
and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1989) [hereinafter McMunigal,
Disclosure and Accuracy]; Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where it Matters: Brady v. Maryland
in the Plea Bargaining Context, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2002).
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impeachment information before their plea.7 Innocent defendants often
have less information about the case against them than guilty defendants
and therefore cannot accurately evaluate the strength of the case against
them.8 For instance, an innocent defendant who is charged with murder
and who was not present at the scene when the homicide occurred may
not know (because he was not there) that there were witnesses to the
shooting who could exculpate him. Innocent defendants also may be
more risk averse than guilty defendants, and, if they are unaware of
potentially exculpatory evidence, they may prefer the certainty of a plea
to the uncertainty of trial.9 This is especially true in a world of
increasingly severe sentences, many of which are controlled by
prosecutors. Innocent defendants faced with draconian penalties who
are offered substantially reduced sentences in exchange for their guilty
pleas, and who are unaware of exculpatory or impeachment evidence,
may believe the chances of success at trial do not outweigh the risk of a
higher sentence that may be imposed upon conviction at trial.' 0
In addition, although some defendants may know whether they
committed the offense, others lack basic facts regarding their own
actions.11 For example, if the defendant was intoxicated during an
altercation, he may not have a particularly clear memory (or he may
distrust his memory) of whether he committed the crime with which he
is charged. That defendant relies on the testimony of others for
information about his own conduct, and lack of access to exculpatory
information or evidence may lead such defendant to plead guilty even if
he is not.
Second, pre-plea access to exculpatory and impeachment
information helps mitigate the potential for inequity in the plea process.
Ideally, plea bargains should discount the sentence in the event of
conviction at trial by the probability that the defendant will be convicted
at trial. Thus, if there is a 50% chance that the defendant would be
convicted at trial and would receive a ten year sentence, the plea should
carry with it a sentence of five years. Unfortunately, the reality of plea
bargaining strays far from that model. 12 Factors completely unrelated to
7 See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ethics and Plea Bargaining: What's Discovery Got to Do With It?, 23
A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUST. 28 (2008) (describing cases in which factually innocent defendants
pleaded guilty).
8 See Bibas, supra note 3, at 2494.
9 See id. at 2509-10. This problem is exacerbated if the defendant does not believe that his
lawyer will sufficiently investigate and litigate his case.
10 See McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, supra note 4, at 661 ("[T]he existence of exculpatory
information weakening the prosecutor's case creates an incentive for the prosecutor to offer a
very large discount on the potential sentence .... This discount in turn creates a very large
incentive for false self-condemnation.").
11 See McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy, supra note 6, at 972-984; see also Bibas, supra
note 3, at 2494.
12 See Bibas, supra note 3, at 2470-96. As Professor Bibas has so persuasively argued,
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the strength of the government's case, including the quality of counsel
and the bail status of the defendant, may affect the bargains defendants
are offered and accept. 13 Lack of information about impeachment or
exculpatory evidence exacerbates the inequity of the plea process
because without access to this information, defendants have no leverage
to obtain pleas that accurately reflect the strength of the government's
case against them.' 4 Access to exculpatory and impeachment evidence
therefore is critical not only to an accurate plea bargaining process, but
also to making this process equitable.
II. THE PRE-PLEA INFORMATIONAL IMBALANCE
Unfortunately, the reality is that a serious pre-plea informational
imbalance exists-prosecutors generally have far more information
about the strengths and weaknesses of cases than do defense counsel.
For instance, in the federal system and in states that require a grand jury
indictment, the government must present sufficient evidence and
witnesses to convince a grand jury that there is probable cause to charge
the defendant. 15  Even in most states where cases proceed by
information rather than grand jury indictment, the defendant has a right
to a preliminary bindover hearing, at which the government must call
witnesses to establish its case. 16  Because of these requirements,
prosecutors must interview at least some of their witnesses early on in
the case and therefore ordinarily have much more information about the
strength of their case at that stage than do defense counsel. 17 At least
structural influences unrelated to the strength of evidence against the defendant "such as lawyer
quality, agency costs, bail and detention rules, sentencing guidelines and statutes, and information
deficits" have skewed plea bargaining. Id. at 2468.
13 Id. at 2479-80. Most troubling, indigent defendants may receive less favorable plea offers
because court-appointed counsel may not have the time or bargaining power to negotiate more
favorable pleas and because indigent defendants are less likely to be released from jail on bail
pending trial. See id.
14 Id. at 2494-96.
15 Although a majority of states do not require indictments, there are still a number of states
in addition to the federal system that do require them in felony cases.
16 In Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913), the Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clause does not give the defendant a right to a preliminary hearing, but the vast majority
of states still provide defendants with that right.
17 This is not to suggest that prosecutors have perfect information early on in their cases. But
the fact remains that at early stages, they are more likely to have a greater amount of information
than defense counsel. And while defense counsel have an ethical obligation to investigate the
facts and law of a case before making a recommendation that a client accept a plea (see CRIM.
JUST. SEC. STANDARDS § 4-6.1 (B) ("Under no circumstances should defense counsel recommend
to a defendant acceptance of a plea unless appropriate investigation and study of the case has
been completed, including an analysis of controlling law and the evidence likely to be introduced
at trial.")), it remains the case that overworked defense counsel are unlikely to investigate cases
pre-plea.
[Vol. 30:3
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some of this information could have a significant impact on the
defendant's decision on a plea offer. For instance, if a prosecutor
knows that a witness has given police a statement exculpating the
defendant, that fact may well cause the defendant to decide to go to
trial. Similarly, the fact that the key witness against the defendant has a
perjury conviction on his record may affect the defendant's decision
about whether to accept a plea. At the very least, possession of this type
of information would appear to put the defendant in a better position to
negotiate a more favorable plea.
For many years, those in favor of requiring pre-plea disclosure of
both traditional exculpatory evidence and impeachment evidence have
argued not only that the Constitution requires such disclosure, but also
that the Constitution is the best mechanism to ensure full disclosure. 18
The government's disclosure obligations in criminal trials are the
subject of well-known constitutional law. Criminal defendants have a
constitutional right to disclosure of all evidence that is favorable to the
accused, in the possession of the government, and material to guilt or
punishment. 19 The right to evidence "favorable to the accused" includes
both exculpatory evidence and impeachment evidence. 20  The
constitutional rule, moreover, applies to evidence in the possession of
not only the prosecutor but also other government attorneys and police
officers. 21
While this disclosure obligation appears relatively broad, the
Court's definition of materiality has limited the circumstances under
which defendants can obtain relief for its violation. 22 In Bagley, a
plurality of the Court concluded that a defendant is entitled to reversal
of his conviction only if the undisclosed evidence is material, and
"evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. ' 23 Although this standard imposes a higher
burden for the defendant than the ordinary harmless error standard, the
decisions in Brady and its progeny still have resulted in pre-trial
disclosure of a great deal of exculpatory and impeachment evidence.
While Brady provides a valuable tool for pre-trial disclosure of
18 See McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy, supra note 6, at 1005-06 (arguing that
recognizing a constitutional disclosure obligation "would likely be the most effective" way of
ensuring that the evidence is disclosed).
19 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667
(1985).
20 See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676. Impeachment
evidence is information that could be used to undermine the credibility of a government witness.
21 See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995).
22 Steven H. Goldberg, What Was Discovered in the Quest for Truth?, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 51,
56 (1990); H. Lee Sarokin and William E. Zuckermann, Presumed Innocent? Restrictions on
Criminal Discovery in Federal Court Belie This Presumption, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1089 (1991).
23 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
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exculpatory information, it does not appear that the Constitution is a
particularly viable, or effective, method of ensuring pre-plea, as
opposed to pre-trial, disclosures. This is so for two reasons: (1) it
appears unlikely that there is a constitutional right to Brady evidence
pre-plea, and (2) even if there is such a right, it is very difficult to obtain
relief for a violation of that right.
The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not require
the government to disclose impeachment evidence before pleas. 24 In
Ruiz, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do
not require that the government disclose, before entry of a defendant's
guilty plea, any impeachment information that would otherwise be
subject to disclosure at trial. 25 While the issue in Ruiz was limited to
pre-plea disclosure of impeachment evidence, rather than traditional
exculpatory Brady evidence,26 it appears unlikely that the Court will
come to a different conclusion for the pre-plea disclosure of Brady
information. At least some of the reasons it gave for concluding that the
right to disclosure of impeachment evidence relates to trials and does
not extend to pleas apply equally to traditional Brady evidence. For
instance, the Court reasoned that "impeachment information is special
in relation to the fairness of a trial, not in respect to whether a plea is
voluntary. '27 It would appear that exculpatory Brady information, like
impeachment information, would relate to the fairness of the trial, rather
than to whether the defendant's plea is voluntary. The Court, moreover,
has taken pains to reject distinctions between exculpatory and
impeachment evidence.28 Although the Court also highlighted the
special risks of requiring the government to disclose impeachment
evidence before a plea-namely the risk that disclosure might
jeopardize the safety of government witnesses-it certainly is far from
clear that the Supreme Court would recognize a pre-plea right to Brady
information.
Even if the Court ultimately concludes that there is a constitutional
right to disclosure of Brady evidence before a plea, the standards that
24 See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
25 Id. at 625. The presentation of the issue in Ruiz was complicated somewhat by the fact that
the defendant was challenging the government's requirement (as a condition of its plea offer) that
she waive disclosure of impeachment information. Nonetheless, the Court made clear that it was
deciding "whether the Constitution requires ... preguilty plea disclosure of impeachment
information," id. at 629, and it made equally clear that its answer to that question is "no."
26 The Court noted that the government's "proposed plea agreement ... specifies [that] the
Goverment will provide 'any [known] information establishing the factual innocence of the
defendant'... ". See id. at 631. Although the exculpatory information the government agreed to
provide is somewhat narrower than the information covered by Brady, the Court made clear
throughout the opinion that it was addressing only impeachment information. Id.
27 Id. at 629 (emphasis in original).
28 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (rejecting the defendant's effort to
distinguish between impeachment and exculpatory evidence).
[Vol. 30:3
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courts have established in order for defendants to prevail on such claims
are almost impossible to meet.29 A couple of courts of appeals post-
Ruiz have allowed defendants to challenge the voluntariness of their
guilty pleas based upon the failure of the government to disclose
exculpatory evidence, 30 but the circumstances under which courts
conclude that a defendant is entitled to prevail on such a claim are very
narrow.31  Part of the reason for this relates to the showing of
"materiality" that a defendant must demonstrate. In order to prevail on
a claim that the government violated defendant's right to Brady
evidence before trial, a defendant must establish "a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. ' 32 In the guilty plea
context, there has been some confusion regarding how this standard
should apply, but a showing of materiality appears to require the
defendant to show, at the very least, that "there is a reasonable
probability that but for the failure to produce such information the
defendant would not have entered the plea but instead would have
insisted on going to trial. '33 The difficulty is that for defendants who
have already pleaded guilty, it is nearly impossible to establish that they
would have acted differently in light of the undisclosed evidence.34
Particularly where the record is unclear regarding what the defendant
knew when he decided to enter into his plea (or where the record
contains only the defendant's testimony), it is difficult to establish how
29 1 recognize that determination of a prosecutor's pretrial disclosure obligation should be and
is a different matter from determination, after a failure to disclose, of whether the defendant'is
entitled to a reversal of his conviction on appeal. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 7. Nonetheless,
prosecutors inevitably rely on the difficulty of meeting the appellate standard when deciding
whether to disclose exculpatory or impeachment material. As such, as a practical matter, the
appellate standard defines the parameters of disclosure.
30 See, e.g., Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278 (1st Cir. 2006); Smith v. Baldwin, 510
F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2007).
31 For instance, in Ferrara, 456 F.3d at 2, the First Circuit concluded that the government's
failure to disclose exculpatory evidence could render a plea involuntary only if it was
"sufficiently outrageous" or when the defendant's misapprehension about the strength of his case
"results from some particularly pernicious form of impermissible conduct that [implicates] due
process concerns."
32 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
33 See United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Tate v. Wood, 963
F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1992)); see also Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127; Lain, supra note 6, at 38
(concluding that "courts have thus far unanimously required defendants to show a reasonable
probability that with Brady disclosure, they would have insisted upon going to trial.")
34 See Douglass, supra note 3, at 477 ("The post-plea Brady standard is so hypothetical, so
flexible, and so diluted that it offers little more than an illusion of protection for most
defendants."). Another problem for defendants is that this standard may require the defendant to
show not only that he would have chosen to go to trial if the evidence were disclosed, but also
that he would have been acquitted at trial. See Lain, supra note 6, at 42-43 ("[T]he problem with
using the 'insist upon trial' materiality standard to judge post-guilty plea Brady claims becomes
clear: defendants can only meet it where the suppressed Brady evidence is strong enough to
plummet the chance of conviction at trial.").
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and why the additional information would have made a difference. 35
Given these difficulties, even defendants in jurisdictions recognizing a
pre-plea Brady obligation who have been able to establish that the
government withheld exculpatory information pre-plea have been
unlikely to succeed in gaining relief.36
Finally, prosecutors in at least some jurisdictions appear to require
waivers of any right to disclosure of exculpatory information or
evidence as a condition of guilty plea offers.37 While a court may be
unlikely to enforce such a waiver if it were to conclude that there is a
right to pre-plea disclosure of exculpatory evidence,38 the Supreme
Court has held that a defendant can waive certain constitutional rights
during the guilty plea process.39 The government certainly will argue
that a waiver is enforceable, and perhaps most importantly, if the plea
agreement includes such a waiver, prosecutors will believe that they are
not required to disclose any Brady information to defendants before
pleas, and they therefore will not disclose that evidence.40 For all of
35 See Douglass, supra note 3, at 478-80.
36 Professor Douglass also argues that recognizing a right to pre-plea disclosure of
exculpatory and impeachment evidence will result in the disclosure of less evidence than
defendants currently receive because prosecutors provide a great deal of inculpatory evidence to
the defendant in order to convince him to accept a guilty plea. According to Professor Douglass,
if the government knows that it is required to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence,
and it also knows that the extent to which the evidence is exculpatory or impeaching will depend
on defendant's knowledge of the government's inculpatory evidence, it will not disclose the
inculpatory evidence, thus resulting in a net loss of information for the defendant. See Douglass,
supra note 3 at 483-85. This argument misses the point that if the inculpatory evidence is
mitigated by impeachment evidence, disclosing only the inculpatory evidence will mislead the
defendant into believing that the government's case is stronger than it is, so the net loss of that
inculpatory information may not harm the defendant as much as the provision of only the
inculpatory information.
37 See Erica G. Franklin, Note, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty Plea Process:
A Debate on the Merits of "Discovery" Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REV. 567, 568-70 (noting practice
of U.S. Attorney's offices in California to require disclosure waivers as a condition of plea);
Douglass, supra note 3, at 509-10 (observing that prosecutors in California "have placed explicit
'Brady waivers' in standard plea agreements.")
38 See Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist's Guide to
Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2040-41 (2000) (arguing that the
Court should not enforce plea-bargain waivers of right to disclosure). The Ninth Circuit held that
requiring the defendant to waive her right to disclosure of impeachment evidence was
unconstitutional, see United States v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2001), but the Supreme Court
reversed on the ground that there was no constitutional right to pre-plea disclosure of
impeachment evidence. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002). At last check, no other
circuit had concluded that waivers of disclosure of exculpatory evidence are unconstitutional or
unenforceable.
39 See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995) (enforcing waiver of
protections of Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which precludes the government from
introducing statements a criminal defendant makes during the course of plea negotiations).
40 Because discovering Brady-type claims after the fact tends to be so difficult, a prosecutor's
understanding that he is obliged to disclose facilitates disclosure much more than relying on the
after-the-fact procedures. Of course, to the extent that remedies are available for the failure to
disclose, such remedies should create disclosure incentives for the prosecution. But if a
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these reasons, the Constitution does not provide prosecutors with an
incentive to disclose exculpatory or impeachment information before
pleas.
III. ARGUMENTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ETHICS RULES TO REQUIRE PRE-
PLEA DiSCLOSURE BY PROSECUTORS
Because the Constitution does not appear to be a particularly
reliable means of ensuring adequate pre-plea disclosures by the
government, the disclosure obligation must come from another source if
it is to exist. The ethical rules governing prosecutors are a natural
source for this obligation because the purpose of the rules is to further
the public's interest in a fair process. Unfortunately, the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, as currently interpreted, may not require pre-
plea disclosure of any evidence covered by the rule, and it is not clear
whether impeachment evidence is even covered by the rule.
Accordingly, the rules need to be amended to clarify that the disclosure
provisions require pre-plea disclosure and the disclosure of any
impeachment information of which the government is aware. Once
amended in these ways, the ethical rules governing prosecutors could
provide an important tool for requiring disclosure for two reasons.
First, there is no materiality requirement under the rules. Second, once
a prosecutor has an ethical obligation to disclose, there is a strong
argument that the government cannot obtain a waiver of its obligations
under the rules.
A. The Ethical Rules Should Be Amended to Reflect the Prosecutor's
Role as Minister of Justice
Rule 3.8(d) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
"The prosecutor in a criminal case shall make timely disclosure to the
defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense ....
Any evidence and information covered by Brady that is "known" to the
prosecutor is subject to "timely" disclosure under the rule.
Unfortunately, the rule never specifies whether "timely" disclosure
requires a prosecutor to disclose evidence prior to the entry of a guilty
plea.42
prosecutor believes that she has obtained a legitimate waiver, she is unlikely to comply with the
disclosure obligation, and it is unlikely that the defendant will discover the undisclosed evidence.
41 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (1983).
42 See Douglass, supra note 3, at 458 ("The rules require prosecutors to disclose exculpatory
957
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Particularly given the rule's recognition that a "prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an
advocate," 43 there is certainly a strong argument that even if the Court
concludes that the Constitution's fair trial Brady requirements do not
apply to pleas, the ethical rules nonetheless should require a prosecutor
who knows of exculpatory information to disclose that information. 44
An example illustrates the point. A prosecutor in a murder case has one
eyewitness who has identified the defendant as the perpetrator. There is
physical evidence that is consistent with the witness's identification, but
the government's case clearly relies upon the identification by the
eyewitness. If that eyewitness later tells the prosecutor that she believes
her original identification was tainted by her desire to ensure that
someone was arrested and that she can no longer say with any certainty
that the defendant is the perpetrator, the prosecutor's failure to disclose
that fact to the defense attorney in the course of plea negotiations both
undermines the accuracy of the proceeding by increasing the risk that an
innocent defendant will plead guilty45 and involves deception by the
prosecutor insofar as he conveys the impression that he could prevail at
trial. Because a prosecutor who undermines accuracy and engages in
deception violates his obligation to act as a minister of justice, the
ethical rules should require the prosecutor to disclose that information.
Despite these arguments, Rule 3.8(d) does not appear to have been
enforced against prosecutors who fail to disclose Brady evidence before
pleas, nor do prosecutors appear to feel obligated by the rule to disclose
it.46 In order to impose this obligation, the rule or comments should
explicitly provide that a prosecutor is required to disclose this evidence
pre-plea in order to comply with the rule.
Rule 3.8(d) is similarly ambiguous with respect to whether Giglio-
information in a 'timely fashion,' though they are ambiguous as to whether that means in time for
trial or in time for an informed plea."); McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy, supra note 6 at
1025 (noting that the "ethical rules dealing with the prosecutorial duty make no mention of plea
negotiations or guilty pleas. Rather, they reflect the same ambiguity about disclosure in the plea
context as the constitutional Brady rule does.").
43 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) cmt 1 (1983).
44 This Essay focuses on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, but similar arguments can
be made under the American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Administration of
Criminal Justice. For example, Standard 3-3.11, which has been adopted in at least some
jurisdictions, contains some of the same ambiguities as those presented in Rule 3.8(d), but there
appears to be a stronger argument that it covers pre-plea disclosures. This standard prohibits
prosecutors from failing to make "timely disclosure" of evidence tending to negate the guilt of the
accused, but it also provides that timely disclosure should be "at the earliest feasible opportunity."
CRIM. JUST. SEC. STANDARDS § 3-3.11.
45 See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
46 See Douglass, supra note 3, at 458 n.86 ("My own research has uncovered no legal ethics
opinion applying a Brady-like obligation to prosecutors in plea bargaining, and no reported case
of a prosecutor subjected to disciplinary action for failing to disclose exculpatory information in
advance of a plea.")
[Vol. 30:3
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type impeachment evidence constitutes "evidence that tends to negate
the guilt of the accused." Some impeachment evidence clearly falls
within the mandate of the rule. For instance, if a key witness against the
defendant recants an earlier inculpatory statement and says that the
defendant was not involved, that recantation could be used to impeach
the testimony of the witness at trial but it also is clearly exculpatory
evidence for the defendant "tending to negate his guilt. '47 But other
impeachment evidence-such as evidence that a key witness has a
motive to lie or has a damaging record of committing perjury-is not so
clear. While this evidence may tend to negate the guilt of the defendant
in the sense that it makes it less likely that the witness is telling the
truth, it does not necessarily establish the factual innocence of the
defendant in the same way as the earlier example of the witness who
says that the defendant was not the perpetrator. 48
The rule and its commentary provide no guidance regarding
whether it covers the latter type of impeachment evidence. There is
some indication, however, that the drafters intended to cover
impeachment evidence, since the drafting committee specified that
"'[w]ith regard to whether information is exculpatory, see Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)."' 49 More recently, the Ethics 2000
Commission of the American Bar Association considered the
applicability of Rule 3.8(d) to impeachment evidence. 50 Although the
Commission ultimately failed to specify that Rule 3.8(d) covers
impeachment evidence, there at least appeared to be some sentiment in
the Commission that Rule 3.8(d) does apply to it. At an early meeting,
the Commission established a consensus that it should add a reference
to impeachment information to Rule 3.8(d). 51 Several months later, it
decided to put the reference to impeachment information in a comment
to the rule, rather than including it in the text of the rule.52 At a later
47 See R. Michael Cassidy, "Soft Words of Hope": Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and the
Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1129, 1170 (2004).
48 Id. at 1170.
49 Id. at 1170 n.227. As Professor Cassidy notes, the reference to "exculpatory information"
is somewhat confusing, since the rule does not require disclosure of "exculpatory information"
and instead uses the phrase "tends to negate the guilt of the accused." The reference to Giglio
nonetheless provides at least some evidence that the drafters were thinking, in the context of this
rule, about both exculpatory Brady evidence and Giglio impeachment evidence.
50 The American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, referred to as the Ethics 2000 Commission, was formed in 1998 to evaluate and update
the rules. Most of the recommendations of the Commission were adopted by the ABA House of
Delegates in 2002. For a fascinating account of the Commission's failure to impose any
additional obligations on prosecutors, see Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003
U. ILL. L. REV. 1573.
51 See ABA Ctr. for Prof'l Responsibility, Comm'n on Evaluation of the Rules of Prof'l
Conduct, Minutes from Dec. 10-12, 1999, Meeting in Amelia Island, Fla., at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/l21099mtg.html.
52 See ABA Ctr. for Prof'l Responsibility, Comm'n on Evaluation of the Rules of Prof l
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meeting, however, the Commission concluded that the proposed
changes unnecessarily duplicated the Rules' requirement that
prosecutors comply with the Constitution. 53 Ultimately, then, despite
the fact that the Commission initially unanimously agreed that Rule 3.8
should require the disclosure of impeachment evidence, the
Commission did not recommend any changes to Rule 3.8(d) or its
commentary. 54
The bottom line is that it is unclear whether Rule 3.8(d) requires
the disclosure of impeachment evidence. As with pre-plea disclosures,
however, the ambiguity surrounding the rule's coverage of
impeachment evidence may have contributed to an absence of
enforcement actions against prosecutors who fail to disclose
impeachment evidence.55 In order to ensure that prosecutors understand
that Rule 3.8(d) requires disclosure of impeachment evidence, the
comment to the rule initially discussed by the Ethics 2000 Commission
should be adopted.
B. The Advantages of the Ethical Rules as a Tool for Disclosure
Once Rule 3.8(d) is amended to clarify that it requires pre-plea
disclosures and that it applies to impeachment evidence, it will be an
important first step toward ensuring disclosure by the government.56
Indeed, as a means of furthering disclosure, the ethical rules offer a
Conduct, Minutes from Feb. 11-13, 2000, Meeting in Dallas, Tex., at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/02 11 OOmtg.html. The fact that the Commission believed it could
ensure the Rule's coverage of impeachment evidence by adding relevant language to the
comment rather than amending the actual Rule, suggests that the Commission believed that the
phrase "tends to negate the guilt of the accused" in the Rule could be legitimately interpreted to
encompass impeachment evidence. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. $ 14 (1983)
("Comments do not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing in
compliance with the Rules.").
53 See ABA Ctr. for Prof'l Responsibility, Comm'n on Evaluation of the Rules of Prof'l
Conduct, Minutes from Mar. 16-17, 2001, Meeting in Charleston, S.C., at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/e2k-03-16mtg.html.
54 According to one member of the Commission, "[tihe Commission decided against
attempting to explicate the relationship between paragraph (d) of this Rule and the prosecutor's
constitutional obligations under Brady and its progeny." Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 441,469 (2002).
55 Cf Cassidy, supra note 47, at 1170 ("[A] review of disciplinary reporters from 1980 to
2002 reveals that no prosecutor in any state has been sanctioned by state bar disciplinary
authorities for failing to reveal promises, rewards, and inducements to a government witness
under the general 'tends to negate guilt' standard of either Rule 3.8(d) or Code provision DR 7-
103(b).").
56 Of course, amending the Model Rules of Professional Conduct does not ensure that the rule
will be adopted in all jurisdictions. Indeed, given the fact that many prosecutors very likely
would resist this change, it is doubtful that all, or even many, jurisdictions would adopt it.
Nonetheless, amendment of the rule, even in some jurisdictions, still would be a positive change.
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couple of advantages over the Constitution. First, Rule 3.8(d), unlike
Brady and Giglio, does not require that the evidence be material in order
to be subject to disclosure. Instead, Rule 3.8(d) requires only that the
evidence "tend[] to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate[] the
offense. '57  As discussed above, even in jurisdictions that have
recognized a constitutional pre-plea disclosure obligation, the
materiality standard poses a significant hurdle for defendants.5 8
Because prosecutors know that they do not have a constitutional
disclosure obligation unless the evidence is material, and because a
prosecutor's assessment of materiality may be even less generous than
the Court's, it is very likely that the constitutional materiality
requirement significantly limits the amount of evidence that actually is
disclosed to defendants. The absence of a materiality requirement in
Rule 3.8(d) makes a prosecutor's obligation to disclose much more
definite, and it therefore should result in a higher rate of disclosure than
has previously occurred. 59
Of course, Rule 3.8(d) requires less disclosure than the
constitutional rule in the sense that it only obligates prosecutors to
disclose "evidence or information known to the prosecutor. ' 60 Thus,
while the constitutional rule requires disclosure of information in
possession of any government agent, i.e., other government lawyers and
the police,61 Rule 3.8(d) requires disclosure only if the prosecutor
knows of the evidence or information. Limiting the ethical rule's
disclosure obligation in this way makes sense because the focus of the
ethical rule is on the conduct of the prosecutor. As a practical matter,
this limitation also alleviates the rule's burden on prosecutors. It is
certainly possible that prosecutors will take affirmative steps to shield
themselves from exculpatory and impeachment evidence so that they do
not have an obligation to disclose. But given the current system in
which the prosecutor is essentially free from any pre-plea disclosure
requirements, a Rule 3.8(d) mandate would provide a net gain in
information.
The second advantage of using Rule 3.8(d) to enforce pre-plea
disclosure obligations is that a prosecutor may not be able to discharge
the requirement by obtaining a waiver from the defendant. As
57 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (1983).
58 See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
59 There is one other way in which the disclosure obligation of Rule 3.8(d) potentially is
broader than that of the Constitution. Rule 3.8(d) requires disclosure of both "evidence" and
"information," while the Constitution appears to require only the disclosure of evidence. See,
e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674-75 (1985) (describing the Court's earlier rulings
as requiring the disclosure of "evidence"). Arguably, then, Rule 3.8(d) would require disclosure
of exculpatory information that would not be admissible at trial, but the Constitution would not
require disclosure of such information.
60 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (1983).
61 See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995).
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discussed above, prosecutors in at least some jurisdictions currently
require the defendant to waive any right to disclosure as a condition of a
plea. There is a strong argument, however, that defendants cannot
waive a prosecutor's Rule 3.8(d) obligations. In general, the Rules of
Professional Conduct are designed to further the public's interest, rather
than to promote the benefit of specific parties. 62 Rule 3.8 in particular
recognizes that a "prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of
justice .... This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see
that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is
decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. ' 63 Because the
obligations set forth in Rule 3.8, including the mandatory disclosure
provision, implicate the prosecutor's responsibility for assuring
systemic justice, there is a strong argument that an individual defendant
should not be able to relieve the prosecutor of those obligations. There
is, moreover, no provision under the Rule for the defendant to waive the
prosecutor's obligations. While some of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct can be waived,64 those rules specify the waiver
circumstances and requirements. 65 To the extent, then, that the practice
of prosecutors in some jurisdictions has been to require waiver of
disclosure obligations, Rule 3.8(d) might be the best mechanism for
assuring such disclosure. 66
By far the most potent criticism of the Model Rules as a means for
enforcing prosecutor's obligations is that enforcement actions are only
infrequently brought, and ethics rules are therefore unlikely to change
the behavior of prosecutors. 67 While this argument has force, ethical
62 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 12 (1983) ("The profession has a
responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest ....
63 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (1983).
64 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1983) (providing that a client can
waive a conflict of interest under certain circumstances); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
4.2 (1983) (prohibiting communication with a represented person unless the other lawyer
consents).
65 See sources cited supra note 64.
66 Professor Douglass argues that defendants benefit from disclosure waivers because those
waivers make it more likely that defendants will be advised at their guilty pleas about the
disclosure rights they would enjoy if they were to go to trial. See Douglass, supra note 3 at 514-
16. Professor Douglass, however, assumes that defendants have little right to pre-plea disclosure
because of Brady's materiality requirement, and that they therefore are not forfeiting any
information gain by agreeing to the waiver. Id. at 511-514. Because Rule 3.8(d) does not require
a showing of materiality, the informational gain from the disclosure would be much greater than
any educational benefit the defendant might obtain by signing a waiver.
67 See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REv. 693 (1987); Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial
Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1133, 1146
(2005) ("[T]he prudent prosecutor is unconcerned about an ethical violation. Even assuming the
prosecutor is aware of his duty to disclose favorable evidence under the professional codes ...,
he has never heard of a prosecutor being disciplined for his exercise of discretion in withholding
evidence.").
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rules still provide a legitimate, albeit imperfect, mechanism for ensuring
disclosure. First, all it takes is one well-publicized disciplinary action in
order to significantly increase compliance. 68  Second, even if
enforcement actions are not brought very frequently, an ethical rule
requiring disclosure gives defense attorneys a tool for ensuring that their
clients have sufficient information to decide whether to plead guilty.
This system, of course, would rely on the diligence of defense counsel
in demanding the information and informing prosecutors of their
obligations. Many of the protections afforded to defendants in the
criminal justice system, however, depend on defense counsel. While
such a system is not perfect, it still represents an improvement over a
system that fails to provide any protection for defendants. Finally,
although there may be at least some prosecutors who follow ethical
rules only if they believe there will be a negative consequence for
violating them, there are other prosecutors who will follow those rules
as long as they know of them. As such, mandatory pre-plea disclosure
provisions would have the effect of influencing many, even if not all,
prosecutors, resulting in an informational gain for many criminal
defendants.
Ethical rules requiring pre-plea disclosure of exculpatory and
impeachment information will not solve the pre-plea informational
imbalance that currently exists in the criminal justice system. They
would, however, provide at least a first step toward ensuring that
defendants in the criminal justice system are "accorded procedural
justice" and that plea bargaining more closely resembles an ethical
enterprise.
68 The very public disbarment of Michael Nifong, the former District Attorney in Durham,
N.C. illustrates that point. See Duff Wilson, Prosecutor in Duke Case Disbarred by Ethics Panel,
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2007, at 11.
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